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1INTRODUCTION
The transfer of military technology la an lasua that has 
only recently boon addressed by analysts o f foreign affairs and 
International polities. Previous controversy has been much more 
concerned with more visible issues like the transfer of military 
aircraft and precision guided weaponry to third world countries, 
and the deployment of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. However,
It has slowly become apparent that the transfer of the 
components of weapons systems and the know-how that Is necessary 
to build these systems involves Implications of equal or greater 
proportions. The transfer of technology is infinitely more 
difficult to regulate than the transfer of actual weaponry 
because technology can be disguised as a civilian commodity, its 
value Is often overlooked, and It often appears In the 
non-tangible forms of information, expert personnel, training 
programs, and investment. Technology transfer can also be 
Infinitely more dangerous than normal modes of arms transfers 
because once the technology is purchased or captured, it is 
relatively easy to reproduce and retransfer. The major force 
behind this new form of arms transfers has been the American 
arms Industry which has taken on a multinational character In 
recent decades. The U.S. government has supported or acquiesced 
in the expansion of technology exports primarily because they 
eerve the needs of the established faotlons in both industry and
government. This paper will examine the implications of the 
tranafer of military technology and how it haa been affected by 
the changing role of American multinational corporat Iona (MNCa).
I. BACKGROUND
Following the cone IuaI on of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon 
announced cutbacka In Ita miltary procurements. The military 
production industries, which had been turning out weapons at a 
record rate, responded by launching aggressive campaigns to sell 
their surplus to foreign customers. The prevailing fear of 
dlmlnahing demands and the decline of the entire military sector 
pushed the American armaments Industries Into a reliance on 
international expansion.1. Furthermore, the easing of Cold war 
tensions in the early 1B70‘8 was another faetor that eonvineed 
many U.S. defense contractors to look for alternate markets. As 
U.S. defense budgets decreased, this enormous sector of the 
American economy had to look to foreign markets to pick up the 
slack This boom In International sales was facilitated by the 
Nixon Administration's Intensive campaign to line up new 
customers for U.S. military products abroad, in general, 
President Nixon's foreign policy encouraged the sale of military 
equipment as a substitute for military aid programa or direct 
American military presence In foreign nations. This policy was 
largely based on the public's reiuotanee to support any
3deployment of U.S. troops which could lead to another Vietnam.
As a result of these new foreign policy pronouncements, often 
referred to as the Nixon Doctrine, many large U.S. armament 
corporations became multinational In their operations and 
overall outlook. The advantages of establishing overseas 
markets, production facilities, and bases of operations were 
undeniable.
Traditionally, American corporations sold arms abroad 
through the Department of Defense or with the Department's 
explicit approval. Today, the D.O.D. still approves traditional 
transfers of fully assembled weapons. However, as American 
defense contractors have become multinational, and as they have 
recently begun to emphasize various forms of Joint and 
cooperative production, the U.S. government has lost much of its 
control over U.S. military technology. The military MNCs have 
become a giant social and economic institution that is largely 
unknown due to the military and corporate secrecy surrounding 
their operations. This secrecy accounts for the facts that many 
MNC activities go unnoticed, and the Information about their 
activities Is rare. In addition, the MNCs are also largely 
unregulated due to the Inherent difficulties In controlling the 
extra-territorial activities of American corporations, in fact, 
many of these companies hide their military operations behind a
4civilian facade. These large transnatIona I corporations can 
easily avoid government controls on their exports by spreading 
military technology abroad through their civilian subsidiaries.4
Nevertheless, many of these corporations find that the 
U.S. government will, In many Instances assist their sales of 
military goods and services to foreign governments. Despite 
some policies to the contrary, the D.O.D. has encouraged almost 
every U.S. arms manufacturer to sell abroad and has become the 
major sales organization In combating the Joint efforts of 
foreign competitors and their governments.^ However, the sales 
that the government Is Involved with represent only a small 
portion of American technology transfers. The trend Is clearly 
toward more technology transfers and Increased 
mu 111natIonallzatIon of the U.S. defense Industry. Jonathon 
Galloway of M.l.T. argues that, Mdependence on foreign sales 
has been Increasing and preconditions exist for furter movement 
toward multinational l zat Ion of product Ion. "6Clear ly, the D.O.D 
tries to Insure the viability of American defense contractors by 
promoting foreign sales. But at the same time, It has become 
apparent that this policy can also lead to the dependence of 
U.S. defense contractors on foreign markets.
5In addition, many U.S. defense contractors have launched 
their own aggressive export campaigns because they recognize 
that the award of lucrative procurement contracts often depends 
on the acquisition of sufficient foreign military sales orders. 
Michael T. Klare of the Institute for Policy Studies explains.
In order, then, to ensure that a pending FMS 
order is ultimately awarded to itself, and not 
to a competitor making the same or similar 
products many U.S. firms engage in a wide range 
of overseas promotional activities designed to 
persuade potential customers to ask for its 
products b^ L brand name when approaching the U.S. 
government 7
Of course, the same is true with respect to coproduction 
arrangements and other technology transfers since they have also 
become an Integral part of the competition between arms 
producers, in fact, the MNCs are even more aggressive In 
pursuing non-off Ida l sales because they don't have the U.S. 
government promoting those sales. Furthermore, the arms 
manufacturers use very elaborate sales promotion techniques that 
sometimes Include questionable or Illegal practices. For 
example, bribery of foreign government or military officials 
appears to be a major factor in the International competition 
for sales. Over three years time, Northrop Corporation Is 
alleged to have put out $30 million in bribes, which is about 
equal to Its total net income during the same period.** it is
cclMr that MNCs are Increasingly transferring u.S. military 
technology abroad; sometimes with u.S. government assistance, 
end soeet lane by circumventing government controls.
For perposes of definition, the tens "arms transfer/sale"
will be used to refer to the transfer of any military 
technology. However, the terms "traditional arms transfer/saIe" 
and "foreign military sales(FMS)," Indicate government to 
government transfers of fully produced weapons and weapon 
systems. These definitions are consistent with those used by 
the U.S. government and the sources used in this paper. The 
term "military technology" includes the actual weapon, spare 
parts, manufacturing equipment, servicing equipment, electronic 
and other precision components, computers and microprocessors, 
patents, consulting services, training services, personnel, 
and/or any Information used to produce, service, or assemble the 
weapon. An equally broad range of modes are used to transfer 
this technology. These Include physical transfers, licensing of 
patents and know-how, turn-key projects (sale of all elements 
noeded to establish a production facility), establishment of a 
foreign subsidiary, purchase of or Investment in a foreign 
corporation, and coproduction agreements in which weapons are 
produced abroad Jointly by the U.S. and the recipient country.9 
Coproduction agreements are of two types: where the U.S. and 
the client state Jointly produce a weapon or its component for 
the client state's military establishment and the U.S. armed
7forces. Coproduction agreements have expanded rapidly In recent 
years. In 1978, the U.S. had major coproduction agreements with 
four countries. By 1982, the U.S. had concluded 78 
coproduction agreements with 22 countries.10
More Important, as the competition for proxies between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union has Increased, the sophistication of 
the weaponry transferred has gone from simple arms to 
top-of-the-line, high technology weapons. Since the late 197CS, 
the U.S. has been willing to provide expensive and sophisticated 
weapons systems for countries in strategic regions of the world 
because the American government fears that these nations would 
otherwise turn to the Soviet Union for military supplies. In 
addition, In the late 1970s, these sales became economically 
important as a means of providing balance of trade advantages 
vis a vis escaping petrodollars. Statistically, In 1983, 1600 
U.S. companies were registered with the State Department as 
exporters of military equipment, and over twenty percent of all 
American military production was devoted to U.S. foreign 
military sa l es .1 1 However , It is important to note that these 
figures show only those arms transfers and coproduction schemes 
that the U.S. government defines as arms transfers and Is aware 
of. Clearly, government figures will not include the flood of 
technology that Is transferred under the guise of commercial 
sales or that escapes the eyes of the U.S. government due to 
Its form or means of transfer.
8The principal laws governing military technology transfers 
are the Export Administration Act(EAA) and the Arms Export and 
Control Act (AECA). The AECA, administered primarily by the 
Department of State, considers technology transfers to be a 
variety of arms exports, rather than a separate phenomenon. In 
fact, the Act only addresses the issue when it states that 
consideration will be riven to coproduction and licensing when 
such production Mbest serves the foreign policy, national 
security, and economy of the U.S.“^ UnlIke, traditional foreign 
military sales, however, there are no guidelines for determining 
when a technology transfer meets the AECA criteria. The 
decision is left to the Secretary of State. More importantly, 
the AECA only reviews those coproduction arrangements that the 
U.S. Is officially Involved In. In other words, the AECA 
doesn't review other forms of technology transfer (I .e. 
Information, training, consulting, Investment, etc.), and the 
act has no Jurisdiction over “commercialM projects (l.e. high 
technology manufacturing and computer transfers) since they 
don't fall under the government's definition of “arms".
Likewise, It is very difficult to apply the AECA to subsidiaries 
of American MNCs operating abroad. The EAA, administered 
primarily by the Department of Commerce, has been ineffective at 
halting transfers of commercial technology that have military 
applications. The problem In this instance Is that D.O.C. 
Jurisdiction Inherently contradicts the Intent of the EAA
9because the purpose of the 0.0.C. Is to help American Industry 
by promoting trade while the EAA was intended to restrict trade. 
The problem Is much more than a lack of money, personnel, or 
effective controls. Professor John Deutch explains the futility 
of the current approach.
...even If you put highly qualified, good people 
In; filled all the recent slots that Commerce 
has not filled; increase the Enforcement 
Division, give them more authority, the best 
people in the world; I don't think that export 
controls can be properly administered in the 
DOC. 3
Even with the stepped up rhetoric against technology leaks to 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, the problem, 
won't be solved unless the Department of Commerce Is removed 
from the regulatory picture. Senator Jake Qarn spoke of the 
complete Inadequacy of these export controls in 1983: "As 
currently administered, export controls serve neither our 
strategic, our commercial, nor our foreign policy needs.
Controls are confusing, incoherently administered, short
14sighted, and ineffective."
As controversy surrounding technology transfers has 
Intensified, President Reagan has noted that such transfers will 
receive "special scrutiny.” His directives have stated that 
transfer decisions will take Into account such issues as the 
economic and Industrial factors for both the U.S. and other
10
participating countries, the Importantce of arms cooperation 
with allies, potential third party transfers, and the protection 
of "sensitive technological and ml l 1 tary capab l l 111 es." 1 ‘J 
Nevetheless, there are conflicting goals within the government 
(economic and military) that have not been resolved. The result 
Is that presumption remains with the legality of technology 
transfers-, l.e. they are still nore likely to occur than not. 
Furthermore, as the International competition among producers 
Intensifies, and as more countries demand coproduction 
arrangements, U.S. officials have been more likely to grant 
them. When faced with adamant clients and defense Industry 
officials, the government will usually agrees to coproduce 
rather than losing the entire sale to another country. l6The 
implMeat ion is that the advent of technology transfers makes It 
likely that more weapons will be transferred and that the 
transfer will Include not Just the weapons, but the means to 
reproduce them.
Another factor enabling military technology transfers Is 
the conflicting interests of the executive departments charged 
with the responsibility of administering export restrictions and 
arms procurement. Jacques Qansler noted that "In almost all 
foreign military sales efforts, there are major 
Interdepartmental confI lets.”^ AI though the D.O.D encourages arms 
manufacturers to sell traditional arms under the FMS and foreign 
military assistance programs, the Department tries to prevent
most transfers of America's most soph Is111cated military 
technology. However, the Department of State will often seek to 
promote these transfers for political and foreign policy 
purposes notwithstanding D.O.D. objections. In addition, there 
are conflicts within the Defense Department Itself. Those 
offices that seek to
protect technology and those, like the Defense Security 
Agency, that seek to promote sales In order to stabilize 
domestic armament Industries are In perpetual disagreement. 
Finally, there Is a major conflict between the 0.0.C. which 
seeks to promote trade, and the D.O.D. which seeks to prevent 
commercial exports of technology that have military 
sppllest ions. Under the EAA the D.O.D. Is charged with the 
responsIbI Ity of making a list of those technologies which 
are considered critical to advanced military production. The 
D.O.C. reviews each export license using this Military 
Critical Technologies List (MCTL) as a guideline. However, 
since the D.O.C. has the final say on commercial export 
licenses, political considerations often outweigh Defense 
Department recommendations. Furthermore, the Influence 
that many large corporations have with governmental 
departments enables them to transfer technology that has 
definite military applications and that may threaten U.S. 
national security. Finally, in those cases where transfers 
are prohibited, armaments producers will simply use an
11
12
alternative mode of transfer in order to circumvent 
governmental guldlelnes.
It Is clear that the armament Industries play an 
Important role in the process of arms transfers by 
encouraging the government to permit major sales and 
agreements. One reason that large firms strve to increase 
their foreign sales volume is that these sales enable them to 
enhance their position In the American market.19 U.S. 
defense contractors can increase their production volume and 
thus lower the unit cost that the U.S. pays for weapons by 
exporting similar arms. Therefore, American firms often push 
the Departments of Defense and State to allow major foreign 
sales, and the bureaucracy is often willing to accede to 
these demands In order to receive Its hardware at reduced 
prices, furthermore, American multinational corporations 
also lobby the U.S. government to implement particular 
policies which will enable them to operate more efficiently 
and with more power in client countries.'*0 For example, U.S. 
MNCs have persuaded the U.S. government to allow 
participation In coproduction arrangements that would not be 
allowed under the AECA if traditional arms were transferred 
Instead of technology. Sometimes a corporation will 
encourage licensing and coproduction schemes because In many 
cases the foreign company involved is really just an overseas 
division of the home company. 2 L The bottom line is that U.S.
13
policy on technology transfers Is heavily influenced by the 
military-industrial complex (MIC). Decisions and policies of 
the Defense Department and other relevant government organs 
are heavily influenced by the armament industries and vice 
versa. In other words, the D.O.D. will often act In the 
Interest of Industry when deciding on technology transfers. 
This is primarily because the interests of the arms 
industries usually coincide with the interests of the D.o.D. 
In general, economic considerations tend to encourage rather 
than discourage most transfers. It has become clear that 
there Is a consortia of government and multinational firms
that together supplies the defense needs of the states of the
?2world. In many cases, one cannot operate without the 
cooperation of the other.
In the case of traditional sales of arms, the U.S. 
government has heightened Its relationship with the armament 
producers by acting as their salesman for foreign transfers. 
The U.S. government has recently begun to assume all 
contractual and financial responslblltles for official 
foreign military sales/3 The government buys arms from U.S. 
defense contractors, finances them, and arranges their sale 
and transfer to foreign nations. Many foreign governments 
prefer this situation because it formally commits the U.S. 
to stand behind the sales over the long haul. More often 
than not, these official sales represent a diplomatic
14
relationship between the U.S. government and that of the 
client state. The benefit to the companies is that the risk 
of cancellation and liability Is greatly reduced when the 
government participates. However, recent data indicate that 
this government Intervention can be grossly Inefficient and 
frequently self-defeating.24 This fact supplies a key motive 
for the increase in the use of coproduction arrangements and 
other forms of technology transfer as substitutes for these 
traditional sales. More often than not, American companies 
can use their mui11nations Iity to avoid government 
Intervention and thus, Increase their profits. In the case 
of major government to government sales of traditional arms, 
the MNCs have no choice but to use government channels of 
transfer. However, long-term economic and military 
considerations are beginning to draw both the arms producers 
and arms purchasers away from traditional arms sales and 
towards the transfer of manufacturing technology.
I I. BENEFITS
The preceding analysis of the motives for transferring 
military technology establishes the fact that most parties 
are involved in that transfer for economic reasons. The MNCs 
are driven by profit, government agencies are motivated to 
insure tne survival of defense conctractors as well as by the
15
desire to lower the costs for u.S. government arms purchases, 
and the recipient countries want to buy the technologies that 
they can not develop on their own. The following section 
will expand upon these advantages of technology transfer and 
also look into the political benefits that these transfers 
accrue.
For at least the short run, traditional sales of 
military technology serve governmental Interests at both the 
political and economic levels. Michael Klare discusses these 
mot Ives.
Although strategic considerations are cited as 
the principal motive for increased military 
sales, Pentagon officials acknowledge other 
compelling reasons: to help secure a favorable 
balance of trade; to Insure full production in 
the ailing aerospace industry; and to extend the 
production runs of U.S. weapons and thus to 
reduce the price Washington pays for Its own 
military hardware. 5
The sale or production of arms abroad decreases the price the 
U.S. government pays for Its own weapons since the cost of 
research and development and production start-up is usually 
passed on to the recipient countries. Furthermore, D.O.D. 
guidelines allow defense contractors to make a bigger profit 
on foreign sales than domestic sales which gives the 
companies an independent motive to search out foreign 
clients.26 Additionally, like all exports, military
16
transfers help the U.S. economy In general. it has been 
common to Justify arms transfers In terms of their ability to 
ameliorate the balance of payments deficit, to spur increased 
commercial transactions, to contribute to the viability of 
the defense Industry, to decrease unemployment, and in the 
case of transfers to Arab states, to help recycle
. -j
petrodoliars.' In particular, coporoductI on arrangements 
with developing countries cut down production costs for the 
U.S. government when components are produced for both the 
U.S. and the recipient country In the recipient country 
because labor and other costs are much cheaper abroad.' 3 As 
the armament Industry has become multinational In character, 
the nature of weapons transfers has begun to adjust to the 
economic realities of the International system. Helena 
Tuomi, of the Tampere Peace Research Institute, explains.
The global tendency appears to be that the 
self-sufficiency and viability of the armaments 
economy, of even the leading military powers, In 
particular in the West, is decreasing. It has 
to adjust to the emerging tendencies In the 
International division of labor in which the 
guiding hand of the MNCs Is more apparent. ^
Clearly, economic considerations are forcing the U.S. arms 
producers to transfer technology and to adopt a multinational 
outlook at the cost of reduced self-sufficiency.
17
The short-term survival of the armaments Industry is 
Insured by foreign sales. The overriding Industry motive for 
allowing technology transfers Is that many American defense 
contractors are dependent upon their current level of exports
if)for their survival. Although U.S. firms are primarily 
committed to the domestic market, they have expanded foreign 
sales whenever Pentagon procurement falls to consume their 
total output. Klare argues that without such an outlet, Many 
sustained downturn in Pentagon outlays would cause havoc in 
the arms Industry." *l It Is generally agreed that government 
supports and inefficiencies have resulted In the many 
structural problems that plague the armament industries. The 
rush to new markets is one of the main methods of alleviating 
these problems which are so threatening to the survival of 
plants, production lines, and Jobs.3* it Is well known that 
there Is an inherent contradiction between the desired 
self-sufficiency of military Industries and the drive for 
competition and efficiency In a free market arena.
Government supports have been used to Insure self-sufficiency 
which has reduced efficiency and has thus created dependency 
on foreign sales. Finally, as many defense Industries take 
on a growing multinational character, they have become even 
more dependent on both foreign transfers and their ability to 
expand Into new markets when current markets decline or are 
saturated.33 The fact that government officials are aware of
18
this situation naturally increases the political leverage 
that the MNCs can muster to support transfers. When 
government supports are at an all time high, and U.S. 
defense contractors are in danger of closing plants, 
goverrment officials can be easlly convinced to a I lew 
technology transfers.
A second Important benefit of mllltarv technology 
transfers is their utility as an Instrument of U.S. forir*gn 
policy. Technology transfers enhance U.S. prestige and 
leadership, and maintain open lines of transportatIon, 
communication, and economic exchange between countries. 
Henry Nau, In his book, Technology Transfers and American 
Foreign Policy, delineates nine specific purposes that 
technology serves In American foreign relations. 1234*68
1. Strengthens allies against communists and 
other adversaries.
2. Promotes economic growth and stability In 
developing nations.
3. Preempts Independent foreign development of 
technologies with military applications.
4. Signals changes in competitive and cooperate
relationships with foreign countries.
6. Influences Internal pllcles of foreign
states.
8. Improves the quality of human and social 
life In the international system, [paraphrase]"
19
Furthermore, technology transfers affect the recipient country's 
will to use their capabilities as well as the level 
of their capabilities by permitting the long-term possession 
of sophisticated weaponry. Nau notes that, “technology Is 
not Just an Instrument of power, that Is, coercive force; it 
Is also an Instrument of Influence, or psychological force."^ 
Additionally, as with traditional arms, the transfer of 
military technology to areas where military tensions are
high, functions as an alternative to direct American
36Intervention. Finally, a major goal of U.S. foreign 
policy, mentioned earlier, is to repossess petrodollars by 
selling OPEC American goods. The major U.S.-produced Item 
demanded by these oil exporting countries is sophisticated 
American arms. The necessity of recycling these vast amounts 
of money is much more than a matter of economics. Klare 
wrItes.
Huge concentrations of capital (petrodollars) 
represent a major threat to international 
monetary stability. Even $10 billion, it 
unloaded on the money market all at once, could 
precipitate a major financial crisis.^7
A related advantage to trr.nsferr Ing technology Is based on 
the value of the information, and the position that the 
MNCs acquire when dealing with foreign governments. The 
technological specialization of weapons increases the power
20
of the arms producers over the political and military 
authorltieds In the recipient nations. Because modern arms 
and technology transfers require spare parts, training aids, 
and maintenance that can only be obtained from the original
supplier, transfers to LDCs give the supplier considerable
isleverage over the recipient's military options. in 
addition, arms transfers provide the supplier with continuing 
access to elites and foreign military leaders who play 
decisive roles in third world politics. This power is 
beneficial to the MNCs since leverage allows them to secure 
favorable conditions for their operations In recipient 
countries. However, the real leverage Is usually exercised 
by the U.S. government. In general, the dependence on 
American technology makes belligerents highly vulnerable to 
pressures from Washington since a piece of advanced weaponry 
can become useless If one little piece malfunctions.39 Thus, 
the U.S. government's power to prevent exports of 
replacement parts gives them significant leverage over 
foreign conflicts. For example, during the October 1973 War, 
Washington and Moscow both used their control over war 
supplies to force Israel and Egypt to ceasefire.
Furthermore, the American government has been able to use the 
vast Information-gathering capablitles of global corporations 
domiciled In the U.S. for Intellgence purposes/*0 MNCs with 
foreign subsidiaries often have huge data banks that hold
21
sensitive foreign military Information that the U.S. 
government often finds valuable In executing Its foreign 
policy. The U.S. has also attempted, through 
extra-terrI tor I a I control of the trading relations of U.S. 
subsidiaries, to extend its foreign policy embargoes Into the 
Jurisdiction of other states. However,, the U.S. government 
has generally not been effective in this practice. For 
example, during the civil war in Angola in 1976, a Gulf OM 
subsidiary actually turned over several hundred million 
dollars to the winning side which the U.S. had not recognized 
as the vIctor Most recently, American MNCs have sold 
military technology to South Africa despite U.S. and U.N. 
policies that forbid these Interactions. in general, the 
U.S. has very little control over its companies that operate 
In other countrles.
In the case of NATO, technology transfers, especially 
coproduction arrangements, may serve to Increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the NATO military alliance. 
U.S. strategists have long sought to promote joint arms 
procurement among Alliance members. Currently, most NATO 
countrless procure or produce their own weapons. As a result 
there Is a waste of money since many countries maintain 
separate research development, and production facilities.
More Important, there Is no Interchangeability between weapon 
systems. This becomes significant on the battlefield when
22
access to supplies becomes restricted and production or 
transportatIon of spare parts from the producing country Is 
not feasible.Clearly then, more coproduction arrangements 
between U.S. and European countries would be beneficial since 
they would promote at least a marginal measure of weapons 
uniformity. As of this writing, the only major attempt at 
standardization through coproduction has been the F-16 
program carried out by U.S. MNCs in Belgium, Holland,
A 3Denmark, and Norway. It would seem that future 
coproduction arrangements with NATO allies hold out definite 
strategic and economic benefits.
Another benefit to technology transfers concerns the 
technology that U.S. firms export to the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern bloc. While It Is not the policy of the American 
government or American corporations to contribute to Soviet 
military capabliites, technology with civilian applications 
often ends up contributing to the Soviet military machine. 
However, some claim that the amount of transferred technology 
that has military uses Is Insignificant and that we should 
keep selling high technology to the East because it helps to 
Improve East-West relations. Advocates argue that without 
better relations, It will be impossible to influence Soviet 
foreign policy and to achieve significant arms control 
agreements. In the 1970s, the U.S. encouraged sales of 
computers and advanced electronic equipment to the U.S.S.R.
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because It was thought that trade would signal an end to the 
Cold War and that It would encourage the Soviets to cooperate 
and negotiate these arms control agreements. Today, although 
trade In high technology has been limited, some still argue 
that as long as we protect our technological advances, the 
Soviet Union will not negotiate with us because they feel 
that U.S. qualitative superiority win prevent fair 
negotiations. However, the esperience of the 1970's seems to 
indicate that the Soviet Union will only take advantage of 
better relations as a means to bulId up Its ml Iitary 
capabilities while the West relaxes Its own bulld-up.
A final and controversial benefit to transferring 
military technology abroad Involves ecnoomlc benefits that 
these transfers may bring to recipient eountires. U.S. 
corporations that set up or license production facilities In 
developing countries sometimes participate In or demand the 
construction of necessary infrestructure. These roads, 
bridges, airports, and telecommunications systems are 
necessary to facilitate major military production plants. 
Obviously, this Infrastructure has commercial purpopses as 
well. Thus, technology transfers may bring with them the
prerequisites for further Industrial development in the
44civilian sector. Unlike traditional arms sales, technology 
transfers can help to offset adverse civilian effects of 
military transfers by furthering the total economic
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development of the recipient nation. Perhaps, many LDCs have 
begun to demand coproduction arrangements because they intend 
to take advantaga of the valuable spin-offs that can result 
from huge industrial ventures. However, most LOCs lack the 
financial and capital requirements to take advantage of these 
potential spin-offs. More often than not, military 
technology and Its accompanying infrastructure remain 
Isolated from the rest of the economy. The potential 
problems with such a dual-economy will be explored In the 
next section.
III. DISADVANTAGES
A. Disadvantages to the United States
While most of the benefits of technology transfers are 
well established, the drawbacks to both the U.S. and to other 
contrles are less apparent. Obviously, the massive scale of 
current transfers proves that policy makers are primarily 
driven by the benefits and can readily ignore the 
disadvantages. However, the benefits of technology transfers 
tend to be short-term while the disadvantages tend to have 
long-term and recurring reprecussIons.
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The first class of problems affect the US. in general, 
the recurring disadvantage to the U.S. is damage to the 
national security. U.S.-designed equipment, especially when 
produced abroad, can be used for purposes inconsistent with 
American security Interests. Valuable tecf nolog i caI secrets 
can be easily lost to hostile powers through inadequate 
security measures or the overthrow of recipient governments. 
Raymond Vernon, of Harvard University, notes, "Military 
planners in any nation have to recognize that, when allies 
fall out, all facilities located in any country are wholly at 
the service of that country."4 in both world wars, for 
extmpto, subsidiaries of allied firms on enemy soil 
eonseitntIousIy produced armaments for the enemy's Industry.46 
Whin these production facilities are actually owned by 
hostile governments, there Is a total loss of U.S. control. 
Once technology falls Into unfriendly hands, it is almost 
impossible to control Its application and distribution, on 
the other hand, the transfer of military technology to third 
world countries often leads to deep and last Inn American 
Involvement In the recipient's arms industry, Implying a U.S. 
commitment far exceeding that represented by traditional arms 
transfers47 The obvious implication is that technology 
transfers may result in U.S. rupport for regimes of dubious 
stability or Questionable intentions. These problems are 
multiplied when the technology I* distributed without
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government knowled . and thus, lacks the safeguards 
necessary to protect advanced technological secrets. in 
addition, it Is clear that the major U S .  defense 
contractors have become dangerously dependent upon f o r e i g n  
sales. This dependency could have significant long-range 
economic, strategic, and political reprecussions. These 
problems stem from the fact that as US. corporations have 
become multinational, they have begun to act independently of 
the U.S. government. By simply leaving Ul- JurI idiot I*n, 
their freedom to interact with foreign government! and choose 
which products they will produce becomes greatly expanded. A 
final problem concerns the difficulty In controlling arms 
transfers at the International level. As more nations 
possess the technology to produce arms, it will be difficult 
it will be to get all countries that sell arms to limit the 
world's supply of weapons.
A problem directly related to coproduction arrangements 
comes into play when u.S. military equipment or components 
are produced abroad or used by both the recipient country and 
the U.S. military. Currently, the present trend is toward 
U.S. dependency on foreign production of critical military 
parts and materials.1*^  (specially in the case of electrical 
prtd electronic components, production and assembly abroad Is 
dh#*p end thug, widespread, it is a basic tenet that the 
y.(, ###«*## industry must be eelf-sufficient, and production
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abroad gravely threatens national security. if critical 
parts cannot be delivered to the U.S. due to transportat ion 
problems o Intentional actions on the part of the producing 
country, U.S. military efforts may be hindered at crucial 
times. The D.O.D. has begun to express concern that the 
U.S. Is becoming too dependent on this foreign production of 
U.S. military hardware, and It has Isolated the greater 
involvement In coproduction arrangements as a major cause of
>othis dependency. Historically, even wholly owned foreign 
subsidiaries of American corporations have been unable to act 
with Independence from the host country In times of American 
involvement In war. There Is clearly a conflict between the 
desire to Insure the viability of American arms producer with 
the comparatively low prices that the U.S. government pays 
and the desire for self-sufficlency.
The second problem with technology transfers Is that 
they threaten to erode America's competitive advantage in the 
development and application of sophisticated new 
technologies. This advantage is crucial since it enables the 
U.S. to remain competitive In both the commercial and 
military spheres. Michael Kiare assesses the current 
situation.
..until now, y.f, officials have largely 
Ignored the policy implications of 
arms*technology axports, the growing soope and 
vltib!Illy of eyoh programs will melee It
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increasingly difficult to do so In the future. 
Already many economists are worried that past or 
present transfers of U.S. arms-making know-how 
have diminished the technological lead of U.S. 
Industries and enhanced the competitive position 
of foreign producers.
It Is clear that sales of military technology enable recipient 
countries to compete with the U.S. in both the sale 
of advanced military equipment and commercial products.
Since the military sector is often the first to integrate new 
computer, electronic, and manufacturing technologies, It Is 
the most likely source of technological spin-offs for 
civilian industries. Ever since U.S. firms began selling 
their most advanced designs and production techniques, the 
comparative advantage of America has shifted outward. As 
more technology escapes, Japanese, French, and West German 
companies will Introduce products into commercial markets 
that Incorporate American technologies and compete with 
American goods. Clearly, the extent and rate of technology
transfers Is increasingly threatening and disruptive to the
52U.S. position In the world economy. Furthermore, the 
mult matlonaIization of the U.S. defense industry poses a 
unique challenge to U.S. security. Vernon explains.
Many multinational enterprises are important 
producers of key military hardware. The 
capacity of such enterprises to communicate
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complex ideas among their affiliates has 
Increased the difficult of sealing in technical 
ideas at the borders of the U.S.
Regulation of these subsidiaries by the U.S. government is 
nearly Impossible. In many instances, these corporations 
have become Independent of any one country's control. The 
result Is that technologies may no longer have a national 
origin. A new development will be owned and controlled by an 
MNC: an independent entity In international relations, with 
the right to 3ell the technology to any country or 
Institution In the world.
In the case of third world countries, the transfer of 
manufacturing technology and military equipment also 
threatens U.S. security. Gansier explains the problem in the 
context of North-South relations.
The once bipolar powr structure Is now 
multipolar, and less-developed countries are 
wielding the power of olI and scarce materials. 
The long-standing American supremacy In 
technology Is dwindling. Large U.S. 
defense-orlented corporations are exhibiting a 
transnational mentality.54
It is the greatly strengthened negotiating position of oil-rich 
countries and the instability of oil-producing 
regions that has led to this uncontrolled transfer of
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military technology. In addition, U.S. companies are often 
willing to give away more and better technology simply to
r.
insure that they can earn lucrative contracts. Companies 
that can't compete efectively often win foreign sales awards 
because of their willingness to give away more technology 
than a competitor. More surprising Is the fact that the 
technology that American a-ms suppliers are currently 
supolylng to Middle Eastern governments Is, in some cases, 
technically more sophisticated than what the U.S. has or can 
afford for Its own forces. For example, in the 1970s, Iran 
was buying a version of the DD983 destroyer that was more 
advanced than the American version.56 The key problem 
Involved in technology transfers Is that the decision to 
transfer is Irreversible. Once released, technology can't be 
controlled and it gives the recipient a base for many 
subsequent gains.57
Clearly, the transfer of military technology enables 
the recipient country, in many cases, to produce arms In 
unlimited quantities. Many of the disadvantages of 
transferring military technology are a result of the removal 
of valuable technology from the control of both the U.S. 
government and U.S. corporations. The multinational armament 
corporations have been more than willing to distribute this 
valuable technology through coproduction arrangements In 
order to maximise profits and clients. Even when it is not
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In a company'a bast long term Interest to release unique 
technologies, the Immediate economic benefits often result In 
Industry participation. Additionally, many MNCs mistakenly 
believe that they will retain control of their technology and 
patents when participating in coproduction arrangements. The 
semI- i ndustrI al nations like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South 
Korea, India, and Israel are the most likely countries to 
attract coproduction agreements with American defense 
contractors. This Is primarily due to the fact that these 
countries can afford the necessary investment. Armament 
corporations often choose to enter Into coproduction 
agreements because they can eliminate their competition for 
customers when they become actively involved in a particular 
country's defense establIshmentThese advanced developing 
countries have launched plans for indigenous military 
production because it both enhances their prestige and 
provides them with military self-suffIcflency. in addition, 
Indigenous production is perceived as means of speeding up 
development.59 The elites In many developing countries 
believe that major high technology enterprises will serve as 
a training ground for future scientists and engineers. In 
the 1970's, the Shah of Iran Justified major arms transfers 
on these grounds.60 The result was that the civilian sector 
never developed and was possibly even hurt because of 
diversion of resources to the military industries. It Is
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speculated that the Shah was overthouwn partially because of 
this neglect of civilian needs. The obvious conclusion Is 
that military technology may not actually contribute to 
economic development and may instead damage its prospects.
The major problem with Indigenous production is the 
fact that U.S. technology can be retransferred to other 
countries without U.S. government or Industry approval. On 
the other hand, some have argued that indigenous production 
may actually result in decreased arms transfers, or even 
serve as an alternative to the procurement of nuclear 
weapons. However, empirical data disproves these claims.
LDC arms producers are among the largest importers of arms, 
and technical capabllltes obtained from military technology 
actually enable LDCs to develop the capacity to produce and 
deploy nuclear weapons^ Finally, the Indian experience 
proves that Indigenous production is also more expensive than 
the Importation of similar arms.2 Indigenous production 
obviously can only result from those technology transfers 
that give a recipient nation the capacity to produce a 
complete or almost complete weapon, in these cases, the 
technology In question could have damaging reprecussions if 
third countries can take advantage of It.
Obviously, the Initial problem Is that with more arms 
producers there will be more weapons produced. Michael Kiare 
wr I tes.
■. ■ .v- ■ ;
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Many specialists believe that technology 
transfers are potentially far more destabilizing 
than regular arms transfers, since many 
recipients of such technology are beginning to 
export arms on their own - thus producing a 
geometric Increase In the world's total supply 
of war-making capabilities. 3
As transfers of U.S. technology allow other countries to produce 
and export arms, U.S. foreign policy can be easily 
frustrated. Foreign governments can and have routed 
U .S .-desIgned or U.S.-equipped military hardware to 
government deemed ineligible for direct transfers because of 
human rights violations, or their support of terrorism. For 
example, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, South Africa, Iraq, and
Libya have received U .S.-dssIgned technology that has been
64produced or assembled In other countries. in addition,
U.S. defense firms have complained that Israel has 
Incorporated U.S.-orlgn technology Into weapons sold to third 
world countries that normally buy from the U.S. Ktare argues
that this pattern is likely to be repeated m  other countries
6 5like Argentina, Brazil, and South Korea. Even In the case 
of transfers to NATO, enhanced domestic arms production 
capability In Europe creates new incentives to increase 
military exports, thus enlarging the flood of sophisticated 
arms into the third world.66 Furthermore, MNCs play a major 
role in retransferrIng embargoed items. Divisions of MNCs 
operating in Singapore, Lebanon, Austria, Sweeden, and
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Switzerland have diverted military technology to third world 
countries which can't buy weapons' technology through rmal 
channels. Gansler n o t e s  that "controls over these third
-7
country passthoughs are virtually useless."* Thus, even 
when recipient countries refuse to retransf®r ti.S. 
technology, the U.S. MNC involved . n a coproduction or 
licensing arrangement will often sell to a blacklisted client 
through hidden channels. Finally, any effort at controlling 
arms on an internatIonal basis will be useless as long as 
retransfers continue. Klare concludes.
Ultimately, however, unilateral restraints .
will prove futile If other owers continue to 
export sophisticated technology to fledgling 
producers - who can then collaborate with other 
nations in the future diffusion of arms-maklng 
capabt1 1 tles.
The third major problem associated with escaping U.S. 
technology is that, In th# case of transfers to Western 
furcpe and Japan, they contribute to commercial developments 
that hurt U.S. competitive advantages In International 
civilian markets. increasingly, Western Europe and Japan 
have emphasized the acquisition of front-end military 
techno log 1 es in order to enhance the productivity and 
sophs 111cat Ion of their own civilian industries. Analysts 
maintain that there is a relatively high degree of
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“spill-overM or “spin-off from military Innovations to the 
civilian sector. it is estimated that twenty to thirty-five 
percent of all military Inventions have civilian 
applications. in the case of developed countries, these 
by-products of military technology are very likely to be 
exploited for economic gain since existing Industries can u$e 
this sophisticated technology to remain competitive or gain 
Important advantages In international markets. Especially |n 
the aerospace Industry, there is a only a vague borderline 
between what constitutes a military or a civilian technology* 
European commercial motives in seeking the cooperation of 
U.S. firms and U.S. technology for military projects are
becoming clearer as Europe seeks these arrangements only when
71developing the most advanced and sophisticated systems. 
Likewise, Japan has built oh the experience and the 
technology gained through military coproduction projects to 
develop Its civilian aircraft industry as well as other high 
technology export industries. The loss of America's 
technological supremacy obviously endangers America's high 
technology Industrlea.
Fourth, a major danger to the U.S. resulting from 
technology transfers Is Soviet acquisition of this 
sophisticated military technology, since U.S. government 
regulations prevent overt transfers of military technology, 
transfers to Eastern bloc nations are usually disguised os
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commercial In nature, or are acquired through retransfers 
from other countries or subsidiaries of American MNCs. In 
the 1970's, as East-West tensions were relaxed and trade in 
technology was encouraged, the Soviet Union neutralized the 
United States' quantitative lead in most classes of nuclear 
and conventional weapons, and made significant challenges to 
our qualitative, technological lead. There Is documented 
proof that technology that the U.S. has sold the Soviet Union 
has been used to produce tanks, armored cars, spy satellites, 
air defense equipment, and even nuclear missile components. 
Recent technology transfers have directly led to Increased 
1 CBM accuracy, ABM advances, and developments In 
anti-submarine warfare.7  ^ Most technologies, like those 
involving computers, electronics, and precision manufacturing 
equipment are procured In the form of components for weapons 
systems or as manufacturing equipment used to produce these 
systems. These technologies are the easiest to hide as 
civilian purchases and are the most Important to long-term 
Soviet military development. Gansler writes.
...It has frequently been difficult to 
distinguish between military and commercial 
applications of the equipment and technology 
requested by Communist countries. Because of 
this ambiguity, there has been a significant 
"bending1* In the area of military equipment 
export controIs. ^
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Furthermore, the Soviet Union Is able to obtain this technology 
through European governments that have previously 
purchased it from the U.S., or from subsidiaries of U.S. 
corporations located In Europe and third world countries.
Nye and Rubin note that the Soviet government Is able to play 
off corporate competitors against each other and that the 
liberal Western governments arc often poorly placed to 
coordinate and enforce corporate behavior, and thus to Insure 
that the home government's Interests are adequately
7 Arepresented. In addition, European countries like France 
and Italy that have sizeable communist parties are 
susceptible to Industrial espionage. Third world countries 
'’hat turn communist "overnight" are also, prime sources of 
Western technology. Furthermore, U.S. officials specifically 
fear leakage from coproduction arrangements. A cabinet 
official admitted In 1979 that "we are concerned that 
advanced technology may fall Into the hands of our
7 r>
adversaries through coproduction of sophisticated weapons."
Once a technology leaves U.S. control It is usually a simple 
task for the Soviet Union to acquire It.
The Implications of these transfers Include their 
contribution to Soviet qua I I tat Ive m ! I Itary advances which,
If allowed to continue, could destabilize the current balance 
of power. In the near future our technological lead may 
evaporate and threats of conflict may become real as we watch
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the Soviet Union match us technologically wnlle overwhelming 
us quantitatively. This could only result In a major 
alteration of the balance of forces and a situation of 
comparative Instability. Presently, the Soviets are able to 
get American technology and Incorporate It Into their 
military structure quicker than ever, while our lead time is 
rapidly decreasing. William Perry observed Soviet advances 
In conventional weaponry.
...the Soviet Union has been out-producing the 
United States by more than two to one In almost 
all categories of conventional weapons.
With their growing technological sophistication, 
the Soviets have not only been able to ovewhelm 
the United States In numbers of _,^eapons, but to 
compete In performance as welI,/J
Likewise, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is at stake. 
The C.I.A. delineated the facts In Its 1982 report.
The U.S. and its Allies traditionally have 
relied on the technological superiority of their 
weapons to preserve a credible counterforce to 
the quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact. 
But that technical superiority Is eroding as the 
Soviet Union and Its Allies Introduce more and 
more sophisticated weaponry - weapons that all 
too often are manufactured with the direct help 
of Western technology.77
39
By giving our enemy the capability to gain a strategic 
advantage, we are forcing ourselves to step up the arms race 
rather than limit It. The more American technology the 
Soviet Union gets the more we are forced to build and pay for 
new highly destructive weapons to guarantee our qualitative 
I ead.
A more Imminent threat stemming from technology 
transfers Is that of Increased Soviet expansionism. 
Historically, the Soviet Union expands when It thinks It will 
encounter the least resistance. Colin Gray of the Hudson 
Institute explains the relation of the balance of mllltarly 
forces to Soviet adventurism.
The Soviet Investment In military high 
technology has not been principally for the 
purpose of preparing for putative victory In the 
big European theater war, leading to central 
nuclear war. Instead, It has been for the 
prupose of checkmating extant AmerIcan/NATO 
military advantages, thereby leaving the Soviet 
Union free to advance In regions where there are 
no clear spheres of Influence.
Carl Gersham predicts the effects of a disadvantageous balance 
of forces.
...It has become clear that the relative 
restrain which the Soviets showed at an earlier 
period was not an Inherent aspect of their
policy but a condition Imposed by circumstance, 
chiefly an unfavorable balance of forces. As 
the balance has changed, so have the 
calculations of risk, with the result that 
future Afghanistans have become more likely. / j
Additionally, technology transfers save the U.S.S.R. research, 
development, and manufacturing money that otherwise 
would have to be diverted from the military sector. With 
these resources available, the Soviet Union can afford to 
carry out expensive expansionary endeavors. The Implications 
of even limited technology transfers are noted by Henry Nau.
Even a small contribution to Soviet capabilities 
when measured against comparable contributions 
to U.S. capabilities may constitute a giant step 
forward In terms of Soviet capabilities alone.
B. Disadvantages to the Third World
The second class of disadvantages primarily affects 
third world recipients of American technology. The most 
obvious problems result from the fact that advanced weapons 
are being transferred to unstable regimes In unstable regions 
of the world. While this can occur with any arms transfer,
It Is multiplied by the freedom given to LDCs when they 
acquire the technology necessarily to produce weapons. Arms 
are made to fight wars with, and more often tnan not,
military technology that the U.S. transfers to third world 
countries Is used precisely for that purpose. Empirical data 
have shown that the increased availability of weapons 
Increases their use and that curtailing arms transfers 
decreases the risk of war.1 The primary motive for 
acquiring weapons is competition with rival neighbors. As 
one country acquires an offensive capability that threatens 
another, the second country responds by acquiring arms In 
order to balance the power of the first country, or in order 
to retain Its Initial advantage. The result is an arms race 
which means Increased tensions, and thus, an Increase
likelihood of war In which the magnitude cf destruction will
H }naturally be greater. Geoffrey Kemp, Professor of 
International Relations at Tufts University notes.
It Is apparent that the "arms race syndrome" 
often results In the spread of more arms around 
the globe, an Increase In the latent potential 
violence in the International system and/or 
regional subsystem without Increased (and 
sometimes decreased) security.
Today, there are many regional arms races In progress that are 
threatening to become full-scale wars with International 
ramifications because the U.S. Is fueling these conflicts 
with military technology.
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Additionally, weapons In and of themselves are 
dangerous when In the hands of potentially hostile and 
aggressive powers. William J. Perry the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs testified 
In 1982.
Over any long period of time, clearly the 
accumulation of large numbers of weapons by 
potential adversaries has the logic of the 
outbreak of war.
Arms kill, destroy property, ruin cities, and threaten the 
existence of nation states. Unfortunately, arms sales also, 
often commit the U.S. to supply more arms, or to deploy 
troops If full-scale hostilities Involving recipient 
countries erupt. Furthermore, given the character of the 
U.S.-Soviet rivalry, a war involving countries where each
i
great power backs a side, carries with it the risk of 
superpower Involvement and confrontation. Barry Blecnman, a 
Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace wrote that arms often "serve as the leading edge of 
great power Involvement In regional conflicts." "Arms 
transfers to third world countries," he notes, "have 
occasionally led to a serious risk of military conflict
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between the two superpowers."' Thus, instead of preventing 
Soviet meddiing In the third world, technology transfers may 
encourage Soviet involvement In regional conflicts.
The aquisitlon of military technology can also lead to 
Immedlate threats to world stability. Military technology, 
Its producers, and proponents profoundly affect levels of 
military tension. Tuoml explains.
It is no exaggeration to say that the present 
wave of militarization Is driven by the 
development of military technology which Is 
supported by various political, economic, and 
bureaucrat Ic Interests/* J
The recent Increase In the sophistication of third world 
military forces Is due to the economic and political motives 
of tiie U.S. government and the MNCs that produce weapons' 
technology. In many cases, the foreign activities of 
American MNCs operating abroad have been so ley responsible 
for actual conf Nets. SI nee World War II, there have been 
seven major armed conflicts and four non-major Incidents that 
were associated with the activities of multinational firms. 
These Include C.I.A. coups In Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954 
and 1963), and Bolivia (1971), as well as the Suez crisis, 
the Nigerian Civil War, Algerian conflicts, and U.S. 
policies toward Cuba In the 1960's.87 American MNCs have
historically Interver.d In the politics and political
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conflicts of their countries both on their own and as agents 
of the American government. In these former cases, these 
corporations were not even military In nature. The point is 
that they used their economic and political position within 
the host country to Insure policies and outcomes that were 
favorable to their business Interests and to the U.S. 
government's political Interest. An additional threat 
emanating from technology transfers Is their propensity to 
lead to the aqulsitlon of nuclear weapons. Tuomi notes.
...some countries with large arms Imports and a 
strong policy of self-reliance in conventional 
arms are also trying to get nuclear capability. 
The conclusion Is that once the high-technology 
military capability Is sought, different 
armament options tend to complement rather than 
exclude each other.88
The bottom line Is that It is not prudent policy to seI 1 
advanced weapons to unstable governments In unstable re9,ons 
Former Pentagon analyst Dale Tahtlnen concludes.
...the possession of highly sophisticated 
weapons by potential belligerents In explosive 
situations enhances the possibility that 
dIsagreements wI I I be settled by fighting 
Instead of diplomacy.8^
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Thus, It is best to keep the U.S. government and U.S. 
corporations out of the military structures of other 
countr1es.
Another relevant Issue concerns the effects of massive 
Inputs of military technology on the structure and 
development of LDC economies. In the preceedlng section, it 
was argued that coproduction arrangements often bring with 
them Infrestructure that Is necessary to development.
However, It was also made clear that large capital 
requirements are needed in order to take advantage of 
potential spin-offs, and that more often than not, military 
technology's Infrastructure remains Isolated from the rest of 
the economy. In fact, Importation and Integration of 
military technology often diverts resources from economic 
development as well as contributing to economic and political 
IrreguIarItIes. The heavy borrowing that Is necessary to 
acquire sophisticated technology and to maintain and 
establish production facilities limits the development 
potential of third world economies. Tuomi argues that “the 
dependence on foreign military technology perpetuates and 
reproduces other forms of economic, technological, and in the 
last Instance, political drnendence. The cost of 
establishing an Indlgeneous production capability often 
exceeds projections and can easily lock LDC governments Into 
what Is often a futile attempt at rapid, Import-based,
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d e v e l o p m e n t .  W i t h o u t  a c c ompany i ng  d e v e l o pm en t s  i n  c omme r c i a l  
i n d u s t r y  and w i t h o u t  any Immed i a t e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  e x p o r t ,  
m i l i t a r y  p r o d u c t i o n  can l a y  an i m p o s s i b l e  f i n a n c i a l  b u r d en  on 
t h e  a l r e a d y  d e b t  p r o ne  LDC e conom i e s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
t e c h n o l o g y  t r a n s f e r s  r e s u l t  In h a rm f u l  f o r e i g n  dependence  and  
f o r e i g n  p e n e t r a t i o n  o f  u n d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  For  e xamp l e ,
In Saud l a  A r a b i a ,  n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e  and t r a d i t i o n s  a r e  In 
dange r  o f  b e i n g  d e s t r o y e d  because  t h e  p e n e t r a t i o n  o f  modern  
t e c h n o l o g y  l n * o  i t  has by f a r  exceeded  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y . ) in many c a s e s ,  t h e  I n t e r n a l  
s t a b i l i t y  and u n i t y  o f  c o u n t r i e s  In s t r a t e g i c  r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  
w o r l d  can be t h r e a t e n e d  by e x p o s u r e  t o  t e c h n o l o g y  and I t s  
modern b y - p r o d u c t s .
In addition, the MNCs wl I I usual ly operate though the 
military establishments of these third world countries when 
concluding transfer and production agreements. These 
connections usually remain strong even after the deals are 
concluded and production facilities are in place. These 
links to LDC power centers and elites give the MNCs enormous 
influence In third world economies and politics. Mary 
Kaldor, editor of The World Military Order, writes.
...the military seems to meet the political 
requirements of International capital under 
these troubled circumstances almost better than 
any other Institution. A powerful, relatively 
autonomous state apparatus - buttressed by 
military coercion - provides a framework of
A 7
stability and predictability within which It is 
relatively easy for multinational capital to 
operate.
In general , the ml l Itary establ Ishments of LDCs are more 
predictable and more efficient to work with than the 
government of these countries. Therefore, MNCs try to Insure 
their survival and terms with host governments by Integrating 
top military officials Into their corporate structures. In 
the same way that the Influence of MNCs can change the power 
structure of LDCs, It Increases - through arms and political 
support - the military establishment's size, autonomy, and 
power, relative to other ruling factions. Therefore, In the 
final analysis, purchases of military technology and hardware 
often hurt prospects for programs and projects that could 
raise the overall living standards of impovershed nations by 
diverting resources to the military sector. Additionally, as 
the military becomes stronger, the chance that It will 
overthrow the civilian government becomes greater. In 
general, these military governments tend to be less concerned 
with human rights, poverty, and education than those 
governments that are made up of civilians. Finally, It Is 
Important to note that the conception of spin-offs, as 
discussed In reference to transfers to developed countries,
Is Inapplicable In most developing countries because they do 
not have the coherent Industrial and economic structures
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necessary to adapt military technology to civilian needs. ** 
Instead, the likely result Is a dual-economy where military 
production diverts resources from development that would be 
beneficial to the civilian populations.
The final drawback of military technology transfers may 
be the most controversI a I. There Is little doubt that the 
transfer of weapons and especially the technology needed to 
produce them gives both the MNCs and the U.S. government at 
least a modicum of political leverage over certain LDC 
actions. It has already been established that In those cases 
where governments who have received U.S. technology are 
overthrown by less cooperative regimes, or where technology 
Is elthei Intentionally or unintentionally transferred to 
recipients who the U.S. did not Intend to be recipients, the 
U.S. loses much of the leverage that technology transfers 
have historically afforded. However, as long as governments 
In power rely on U.S. support and need U.S. technology, some 
leverage Is gained. For example, the U.S. requires certain 
countries to meet human rights standards or to allow the U.S. 
access to military bases as a prerequisite for continued 
transfers of technology. The reason for controversy Is that, 
In many cases, the extraordinary Influence over LDC politics 
that the U.S. government and U.S.-based MNCs have, can hurt 
the U.S. In a variety of ways. Tuoml argues that 
coproduction creates an enormous amount of Influence for the
49
U.S. compared to the Influence gained through traditional 
arms sales. She notes that "this naturally creates a 
transnational production network which facilitates further 
Integration of production on an International scale and tends 
to Increase U.S. political and economic leverage." This 
leverage probably benefits U.S. foreign policy In some cases 
but It Is certainly damaging to LDC autonomy. LDC 
governments find It difficult to pursue programs aimed at 
self-sufficiency when outside governments and companies are 
Interfering In political processes and economic development 
schemes. In addition, U.S. corporations have been able to 
easily translate their economic power Into effective 
political Influence. MNCs have, In the past, hired private 
armies, bribed host country politicians and officials, made 
strategic contributions, and have generally tried to 
Influence the prevailing climate of opinions to meet their 
needs. The potential for Interference by corporations that 
control Important segments of LDC military production Is 
enormous.
One of the most Illustrative examples of U.S. 
technology transfers to third world governments by MNCs 
Involves the American experience In Iran. In the 1970's, as 
the U.S. tried to establish a base In the Persian Gulf, a 
strong link rapidly developed between the posturo of the U.S. 
defense Industry and the government of the Shah of Iran. In
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Iran, the transfer of military technology was the pacemaker 
for the entry of MNCs and the establishment of Industrial 
facilities In the Iranian economy.^ Although this military 
development seemed to benefit education, health, and the 
Iranian economy, It produced a number of developments that 
were Inconsistent with Iranian traditions and culture. It Is 
now obvious that the U.S.-backed armament program of the late 
Shah produced economic dislocations and popular resentments 
that ultimately contributed to his downfall?7 In addition, 
Iran's arms purchasing Influenced arms programs In the U.S. 
Certain weapons systems only came Into production with 
Iranian pressure and Iranian money. For example, Iran 
stopped the abandonment of the Condor Missile program 
slnglehandedly?8 In a 1975 report, the U.S. Comptroller 
General said that the defense capability of the U.S. had been 
endangered by the assignment of U.S. military specialists to 
the planning and construction of the Iranian military 
apparatus." In 1976, the Shah provided $28 million of 
advanced payments to save the Grumman Corporation.
Grumman, one of the major U.S. defense contractors, was on 
the brink of closing down, despite massive U.S. government 
subsidies. Thus, technology transfers pose the additional 
danger of giving forlegn governments too much Influence over 
the activities and survival of the American armaments 
Industry. The Iranian experience shows the dangers that
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technology transfers pose to LDC governments, societies, and 
stability, as well as to American security and foreign 
poI Icy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Technology transfers have clearly become an Integra! 
part of America's leading export industry, the armament 
Industry. As European exporters have begun to compete with 
the American Industry, and as U.S. defense contractors have 
found It necessary to search for new markets, technology 
transfers, In the form of coproduction agreements and the 
sale of the technology needed to produce weapons, have become 
the new strategy of American MNCs competing in the 
International arms trade. Technology transfers have 
revolutionized the arms trade by allowing the transfer of the 
capability to reproduce a weapon virtually an unlimited 
number of times. In other words, the control over how many 
weapons a given country will receive has been removed from 
the supplying country. Likewise, technology transfers have 
removed the control of military technology from the nation 
state and have given It to the MNCs which can act In an 
Independent capacity by circumventing governmental controls. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. government has recognized the economic 
benefits and necessities of these technology transfers, as
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well as the political advantages of arms transfers, In 
general. As a result, In many cases, the government and the 
MNCs act In concert to promote technology transfers. The 
drawbacks of technology transfers, however, have been largely 
Ignored by policy makers and the MNCs. This paper has, 
primarily, served to show that the potential long-term 
disadvantages of transferring military technology should 
dictate future policy decisions. Long-term priorities point 
to the necessity of withholding soph I s 11 I cat.ed military 
technology from undeveloped countries, the Soviet Union, and 
any nation that may disrupt U.S. foreign policy by 
retransferrrIng valuable American technology. Clearly, the 
U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic 
well-being are at stake. However, It must be recognised that 
the stability of many third world countries, as well as the 
entire system of nation states are also Jeopardized by the 
unregulated activities of MNCs.
Although It may be beneficial to enter into 
coproduction agreements with our NATO allies, or to transfer 
technologies that have no direct military applications to the 
Soviet Union, most of these transfers should be reassessed.
The laws and policies of the status quo must be reformed In 
order to specifically address this problem. Klare concludes.
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Clearly, existing congressional and presidential 
POI IcIes on arms-techncIogy exports are woeful ly 
Inadequate. What Is needed, in their place, Is 
a comprehensive polIcy on coproduction and 
licensing that provides clear and precise 
guidelines on when, and under what specified 
circumstances, agreements of this type should be 
concluded.
There must be separate guldlelnes for reviewing technology 
transfers, and they must be administered outside the 
executive agencies that have traditionally advocated 
transfers or Ignored relevant guidelines. If this 
supervision Is separate from traditional arms transfers, and 
addresses the problems of dual-use technolgles (military and 
civilian applIclatIons) and the activities of MNCs, there 
should be significant Improvements. It has been suggested 
that new guidelines should prohibit any technology transfer 
that has the potential to seriously damage the economic 
health of the U.S.; undermines arms control, human rights, or 
development policy of the U.S.; or contributes to regional 
arms races or military adventurism.102 These criteria 
provide a good start for the development of new regulations. 
Specific regulations must also address the activities of 
foreign subsidiaries of American MNCs. The only feasible 
method of control Is to hold the parent corporation, based In 
the U.S., wholly repsonslble for the activities of Its 
subsidiaries. However, It must be recognized that the
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existence of MNCs and the decline of the nation state's 
regulatory power makes a complete solution to the technology 
transfer Impossible. It Is clear that the transfer of 
military technology has become an Inherent feature of 
International trade and foreign policy In the world system. 
Nevertheless, the recognition of the disadvantages of 
technology transfers and the enactment of effective 
guidelines and/or regulations should, at least, reduce t:,e 
flow of the most dangerous technology.
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